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Fifty years after it was decided, Brandenburg v. Ohio1
remains a cornerstone of modern First Amendment jurisprudence.
Brandenburg represented the culmination of the Supreme Court’s
long struggle, dating back to the Espionage Act cases of the early
twentieth century,2 to articulate a constitutional standard
governing the advocacy of lawless conduct. Perhaps more than any
other single case, Brandenburg encapsulates the exceptional
nature of American free speech culture—one marked by an
extreme suspicion of any government regulation of public discourse
and a correspondingly high tolerance for potential social harms
caused by speech.3 Unlike the more balancing-oriented approaches
to dangerous advocacy adopted by otherWestern democracies4 and
the Court’s own prior cases,5 Brandenburg established a blunt,
† Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. This Essay was
prepared in conjunction with the Brooklyn Law Review’s Symposium on “Incitement At
100—And 50—And Today: Free Speech and Violence in the Modern World.” Many
thanks to the participants of the symposium for their helpful comments and questions.
1 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
2 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Frohwerk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
3 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460–61 (2011) (observing that although
speech can “inflict great pain[,] . . . [a]s a Nation we have chosen . . . to protect even hurtful
speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate”); Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (“First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the
government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible end.”); Dale
Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in the First Amendment, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV.
579, 586 (2004) (“The Court had long been a guardian against letting the state assume the
role of guardian over the minds of the people.”).
4 See, e.g., Daphne Barak-Erez & David Scharia, Freedom of Speech, Support
for Terrorism, and the Challenge of Global Constitutional Law, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 1,
5–19 (2011) (contrasting the European approach to dangerous advocacy with the
American approach).
5 See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (adopting Judge
Learned Hand’s approach that “[i]n each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the
‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary
to avoid the danger” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201,
212 (2d Cir. 1950))); Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (basing constitutional protection on “whether
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highly protective standard that permits regulation only when
“such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”6
But the world in which Brandenburg was decided is
markedly different from the world of today. In recent years,
terrorist advocacy—that is, broad advocacy of violent, terroristic
conduct that falls short of the incitement standard—has
contributed to a number of devastating terrorist attacks, such as
the Orlando nightclub shooting, the Boston Marathon bombings,
and the shootings in San Bernardino.7 And unlike in the world of
1969—in which dangerous advocacy was primarily disseminated
via purely physical means, like public rallies or leaflets8—terrorist
advocacy today is disseminated widely and cheaply via the internet
and channeled through social media.9 As such, some scholars have
argued that given these technological changes, the highly stringent
Brandenburg standard is ripe for adjustment:10While the standard
might havemade sense in a world of rallies and leafleting, perhaps
it no longer fits a world where technological development has
drastically amplified the harms associated with dangerous
advocacy falling short of that standard.
Such arguments raise a fundamental question regarding
the nature of Brandenburg. On the one hand, one might
conceptualize the standard in purely instrumental terms—that
is, as simply seeking to capture an optimal balance between free
speech and state regulatory interests. Viewed in this manner,
Brandenburg is ultimately a pragmatic standard that reflects the
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent,” observing that “[i]t is a question of proximity and degree”).
6 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
7 See infra notes 19–25.
8 Brandenburg itself dealt with dangerous advocacy uttered during a Ku Klux
Klan rally. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444–47; see also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 106–
07 (1973) (per curiam) (speech at an anti-war protest on a college campus); cf. Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 830–34 (1976) (rally and distribution of leaflets at a military base).
9 To be sure, the audience-expanding potential of new technologies was already
clear at the time of Brandenburg, as the rally in that case was recorded and portions of it
were broadcast locally and nationally. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445. But the advent
of the internet has both broadened the scope of speech dissemination and radically lowered
the cost of such dissemination to a degree that would be utterly foreign in the world of 1969.
See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALEL.J. 1805, 1806–07
(1995) (observing that in contrast to the pre-internet era, in which finding a publisher or
“[g]etting access to nationwide radio and TV” was difficult for the poor or those with
unorthodox views, the advent of the internet allows for “[c]heap speech [which] will mean
that far more speakers—rich and poor, popular and not, banal and avant garde—will be
able to make their work available to all”); Sonja R.West, The “Press,” Then&Now, 77 OHIO
ST. L.J. 49, 90 (2016) (observing that “[i]n contrast to the world of early Americans, today
almost ‘anything and everything’ truly can be published andwidely distributed by basically
anyone and with little cost” via “modern mass communication technology”).
10 See infra notes 101–102 and accompanying text.
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prevailing technological and social conditions of its time—one
that may grow obsolete as those conditions shift. On the other
hand, one might conceptualize the standard inmore deontological
terms—as inextricably tied to foundational principles that are
essential to any meaningful conception of free speech, regardless
of any intervening technological or social changes.
These sorts of questions are not unique to First Amendment
doctrine. Rather, they are the product of the natural tension that
arises between longstanding constitutional rights doctrine and the
advent of significant technological change. Andwhile the Court has
yet to address this tension in the Brandenburg context, it recently
confronted a parallel issue in Carpenter v. United States,11 a
landmark Fourth Amendment decision that deemed the
government’s warrantless acquisition of a criminal suspect’s cell-
site location data unconstitutional.12 A close examination of the
scenario posed in Carpenter and the Court’s approach to that case
helps to frame the central theoretical debate underlying
Brandenburg’s continued viability and illuminates the various
pivot points around which the debate rests.
This essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, I discuss the
sort of online terrorist advocacy that has served as the impetus
for many of the current proposals to modify the Brandenburg
standard. In Part II, I analyze—through the lens of the Court’s
recent decision in Carpenter—the argument that significant
intervening technological changes have effectively rendered the
Brandenburg standard obsolete and ripe for reformulation. In
Part III, I identify and discuss some of the normative and
empirical pivot points upon which the debate rests.
I. TERRORIST ADVOCACY VIAONLINE SPEECH13
The primary impetus for many of the recent proposals to
overhaul the Brandenburg standard has been the increased
incidence of violent attacks linked to online terrorist advocacy.14 The
most notable example of this is the pervasive influence of the
extremist cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. Before his death in 2011, Awlaki
was directly or indirectly tied to a wide range of actual and
11 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
12 Id. at 2223.
13 Much of my discussion in this Part draws from my previous work. See David
S. Han, Terrorist Advocacy and Exceptional Circumstances, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 487,
489–93 (2017).
14 See, e.g., Eric Posner, ISIS Gives Us No Choice but to Consider Limits on Speech,
SLATE: VIEW FROM CHI. (Dec. 15, 2015, 5:37 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_
politics/view_from_chicago/2015/12/isis_s_online_radicalization_efforts_present_an_
unprecedented_danger.html [https://perma.cc/GGY7-EUXE].
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attempted terrorist attacks, including the Fort Hood shootings,15 the
stabbing of British MP Stephen Timms,16 a 2010 attempt to bomb
Times Square,17 and a 2009 attempt to blow up aNorthwest Airlines
plane with plastic explosives.18 And after his death, Awlaki’s
influence seemed to expand rather than diminish;19 terrorist acts
inspired by his teachings include the 2013 Boston Marathon
bombing,20 the 2015 shootings in San Bernardino,21 the 2015 killing
of five soldiers at a military installation in Tennessee,22 the 2016
Orlando nightclub shootings,23 the 2016 attack at Ohio State
University,24 and the 2016 bombings inNewYork andNew Jersey.25
In most of these cases, Awlaki did not play any active role in
planning the attacks, nor did he specifically encourage the attackers
to dowhat they did; indeed,many of the incidents occurredwell after
his death.26 Rather, his influence came primarily through tracts and
lectures posted online, in which he exhorted Muslims, in the
15 See David Johnston & Scott Shane, U.S. Knew of Suspect’s Tie to Radical
Cleric, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/10/us/10inquire.html
[https://perma.cc/5W4B-F2SZ].
16 See Vikram Dodd, Roshonara Choudhry: Police Interview Extracts, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 3, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/nov/03/roshonara-choudhry-police-
interview [https://perma.cc/29UJ-PYJ9].
17 See Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, Times Sq. Bomb Suspect Is Linked to
Militant Cleric, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/world/
middleeast/07awlaki-.html [https://perma.cc/KM84-V82J].
18 See Scott Shane, Inside Al Qaeda’s Plot to Blow Up an American Airliner,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/us/politics/anwar-
awlaki-underwear-bomber-abdulmutallab.html [https://perma.cc/LAK6-MZNH].
19 See Scott Shane, The Lessons of Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/magazine/the-lessons-of-anwar-al-awlaki.html
?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/N666-SDXA] (“Awlaki’s pronouncements seem to carry greater
authority today than when he was living, because America killed him.”).
20 See id.
21 See Greg Miller, Al-Qaeda Figure Seen as Key Inspiration for San




22 See Devlin Barrett & Arian Campo-Flores, Investigators See Radicalization in
Chattanooga Shooter, WALL STREET J. (July 21, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/invest
igators-see-radicalization-in-chattanooga-gunman-1437510290 [https://perma.cc/4UHS-PK7T].
23 See Adam Goldman et al., FBI Had Closely Scrutinized the Orlando Shooter




24 See Mitch Smith & Richard Pérez-Peña, Ohio State Attacker May Have Been
‘Inspired’ by Al Qaeda, F.B.I. Says, N.Y.TIMES (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/
30/us/ohio-state-university-attack-abdul-razak-ali-artan.html [https://perma.cc/XRA7-RRBB].
25 SeeEllenNakashima et al.,AhmadRahami, SuspectedNewYorkBomber, Cited
al-Qaeda and ISIS, Officials Say, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/09/20/new-york-bombing-suspect-charged-with-using-
weapons-of-mass-destruction/?utm_term=.60abb66c36d9 [https://perma.cc/R8VT-4BUF].
26 See e.g., Shane, supra note 19.
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abstract, to go to war with perceived enemies of Islam.27 For
example, in one video, Awlaki stated: “Don’t consult with anyone in
the killing of Americans. Fighting the devil doesn’t require
consultation or prayers seeking divine guidance. They are the party
of the devils. Fighting them iswhat is called for at this time.Wehave
reached a point where it is either us or them.”28 In other videos,
Awlaki “explain[ed] why you should never trust a non-Muslim; how
theUnited States is at war with Islam; [and] whyNidal Hasan, who
fatally shot 13 people at Fort Hood, and Umar Farouk
Abulmutallab, who tried to blow up an airliner over Detroit, were
heroes.”29 As Alexander Tsesis observed, “al-Awlaki’s videos
typically do not call for specific or immediate violence but speak of
the perceived enemies of Islam in dehumanizing terms and justify
killing themwhenever necessary.”30
Many of these videos quickly found their way to popular
streaming sites. In August 2017, a search for “Anwar al-Awlaki”
on YouTube yielded over seventy thousand results,31 and as the
New York Times reported, “[t]he number of videos on YouTube
presenting or celebrating his work more than doubled from 2014
to 2017, even as investigators found his decisive influence in
most of the major terrorist attacks in the United States and
some in Europe.”32 Indeed, up until 2016, Awlaki’s “Call to
Jihad”—a talk that explicitly “call[ed] on Western Muslims to
join the jihad in the Middle East or carry out attacks at home”—
was easily accessible on YouTube.33
Through these online materials, Awlaki served as a
driving force in the now familiar radicalization narrative. In the
aftermath of radical Islamist terrorist attacks or attempts, it has
become nearly inevitable that investigation would ultimately
reveal the substantial role that Awlaki’s teachings played in the
attacker’s path to radicalization. This was the case with respect
to, for example, Roshonara Choudhry (who stabbed British MP
27 See Robert Mackey, Anwar al-Awlaki in His Own Words, GUARDIAN (Sept.
30, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/30/anwar-al-awlaki-video-blogs
[https://perma.cc/7V2W-TJWE].
28 Obama Hails al-Awlaki Death as ‘Significant Milestone’ in al-Qaida Fight,
PBS NEWS HOUR (Sept. 30, 2011), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/obama-hails-al-
awlaki-death-as-significant-milestone-in-al-qaida-fight [https://perma.cc/QB8P-QGG7].
29 See Shane, supra note 19.
30 Alexander Tsesis, Inflammatory Speech: Offense Versus Incitement, 97 MINN. L.
REV. 1145, 1169–70 (2013).
31 Fast Facts: Anwar al-Awlaki on YouTube, COUNTER EXTREMISM PROJECT,
https://www.counterextremism.com/anwar-al-awlaki-youtube [https://perma.cc/S28F-E7XS].
32 Scott Shane, In ‘Watershed Moment,’ YouTube Blocks Extremist Cleric’s
Message, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/12/us/politics/
youtube-terrorism-anwar-al-awlaki.html [https://perma.cc/KUS6-CH2D].
33 Id.
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Stephen Timms);34 Dzokhar Tsarnaev (the Boston Marathon
bomber),35 Omar Mateen (the Orlando nightclub shooter),36 and
Rizwan Farook (one of the San Bernardino shooters).37According
to a United States counterterrorism official, “If you were to look
at people who had committed acts of terrorism or had been
arrested and you took a poll, you’d find that the majority of them
had some kind of exposure to Awlaki.”38
The efficacy of this sort of broad terrorist advocacy is strongly
tied to the use of socialmedia. Extremists of all stripes, ranging from
ISIS to alt-right extremists, have relied heavily on social media
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter to disseminate terrorist
advocacy and recruit people to their causes. An ISIS recruit, for
example, described his initial involvement with the organization as
interactions through Tumblr, Facebook, and Instagram,39 and some
Twitter accounts linked to ISIS “half-jokingly put the location on
their profile as ‘Wilayat Twitter,’ or ‘the province of Twitter.’”40 And
such online radicalization need not occur under the direct
management of a discrete organization. An examination of the social
media history of Cesar Sayoc Jr.—who was charged with sending
pipe bombs to a number of President Trump’s critics in 2018—
revealed a rapid transition from typical and unremarkable activity
up to 2016 to increasingly obsessive and frequent posts and links
regarding right-wing conspiracy theories leading up to the attacks.41
Indeed, the prominent role of social media in breeding dangerous
34 In a police interrogation, Choudhry stated that she downloaded and watched
“[m]ore than a hundred hours” of Awlaki’s lectures, that she learned from his lectures
that Muslims “shouldn’t allow the people who oppress us to get away with it,” and that
this caused her to carry out her attack. See Dodd, supra note 16.
35 See Shane, supra note 19.
36 See Goldman et al., supra note 23.
37 See Greg Miller, Al-Qaeda Figure Seen as Key Inspiration for San
Bernardino Attacker, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/al-qaeda-figure-seen-as-key-inspiration-for-san-bernardino-
attacker/2015/12/18/f0e00d80-a5a0-11e5-9c4e-be37f66848bb_story.html?utm_term=
.fe303970d953 [https://perma.cc/8W97-BMBK] (describing how Farook “immersed
[himself] in Awlaki’s teachings for years”).
38 Josh Meyer, Anwar al-Awlaki: The Radical Cleric Inspiring Terror from
Beyond the Grave, NBC NEWS (Sept. 21, 2016, 7:01 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/
news/us-news/anwar-al-awlaki-radical-cleric-inspiring-terror-beyond-grave-n651296
[https://perma.cc/PD2B-T2SN]; see also Shane, supra note 19 (reporting that discoveries
of Awlaki’s influence “have become routine,” holding true “in dozens of cases”).
39 Chapter 2: Recruitment, N.Y. TIMES: CALIPHATE (Sept. 20, 2018),
https://nyti.ms/2NsfkHl [https://perma.cc/98SZ-GMG3].
40 Mike Isaac, Twitter Steps Up Efforts to Thwart Terrorists’ Tweets, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 5, 2016), https://nyti.ms/1miAODK [https://perma.cc/E7UT-N9P8].
41 SeeKevinRoose,Cesar Sayoc’s Path onSocialMedia: FromFoodPhotos to Partisan
Fury, N.Y.TIMES (Oct. 27, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2JjgXSr [https://perma.cc/JB6M-4XE3].
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extremism has led to a major crackdown on terrorist advocacy by
Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube over the past few years.42
Despite the violence that has resulted from such advocacy,
however, current First Amendment doctrine significantly limits
the government’s ability to regulate it. The government has
substantial freedom to regulate speech based on its content only
when that speech falls within one of the designated categories of
low-value speech,43 and under Brandenburg,44 the government
can regulate dangerous advocacy only when it is “directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action.”45
Most terrorist advocacy, however, would not fall within
the stringent Brandenburg standard. Take, for example, Awlaki’s
abstract exhortation regarding the “killing of Americans” quoted
above. Even if one were to assume that the speech would likely
produce lawless action in the abstract, any such action is highly
unlikely to be “imminent” under the Court’s strict reading of that
42 See, e.g., Twitter Suspended 166,153 Accounts for Terrorism Content in Second
Half 2018, REUTERS (May 9, 2019, 9:41 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-twitter-
security/twitter-suspended-166153-accounts-for-terrorism-content-in-second-half-2018-
idUSKCN1SF1LN [https://perma.cc/VH9Q-ARSC] (describing Twitter’s efforts to remove
extremist content from its platform); Mike Isaac & Kevin Roose, Facebook Bars Alex Jones,
Louis Farrakhan, and Others From Its Services, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/02/technology/facebook-alex-jones-louis-farrakhan-ban.html
[https://perma.cc/4ENH-3YZT] (describing Facebook’s decision to bar a number of
extremists from its platform); Shane, supra note 32 (describing YouTube’s decision to
“drastically reduce[ ] its video archive” of Anwar al-Awlaki).
43 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There
are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”).
44 Other potentially relevant categories of low-value speech may include true
threats, which the Court has defined as “statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals,” Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003),
and speech integral to criminal conduct, such as aiding and abetting a crime. See Giboney
v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949).
45 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). Brandenburg
is generally read as a categorical rejection of the Court’s previous approach to dangerous
advocacy, replacing that more deferential approach with a highly speech-protective
blanket rule. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH
IN AMERICA 232 (1988) (calling Brandenburg “the perfect ending to a long story”);
Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTREDAMEL.REV. 655, 657 (2009)
(“[T]he Brandenburg test has provided the governing standard in this area for four
decades and is often hailed as the final word on the government’s power to restrict
criminal advocacy.”). As scholars have noted, however, the Court never technically
overruled many of those earlier, more deferential cases, thus potentially leaving courts
some room to depart from Brandenburg in certain cases. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins &
David M. Skover, What is War?: Reflections on Free Speech in “Wartime,” 36 RUTGERS
L.J. 833, 849 (2005) (observing that “Schenck and its offspring remain binding law” and
that “Brandenburg is readily distinguishable” because “it did not involve a prosecution
for speech that interfered with war efforts”); Healy, supra, at 660 (observing that
Brandenburg does not make clear “whether it applies during war as well as peace, or
whether it overrules the Cold War case of Dennis v. United States”).
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requirement. Rather, the statement is, at worst, “advocacy of
illegal action at some indefinite future time.”46 And the Court has
made clear that this sort of abstract advocacy of lawless action47
is entitled to full protection under the First Amendment,48 such
that any content-based restrictions on the speech are evaluated
under strict scrutiny—an onerous standard of review that, at
least in the free speech context, effectively preordains a finding of
unconstitutionality.49 Thus, in practical terms, the First
Amendment broadly prohibits the government from regulating
online terrorist advocacy based on its content.
II. CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES AND THEQUESTION OF
DOCTRINALOBSOLESCENCE
The increase of terrorist attacks rooted in online terrorist
advocacy, however, has led a number of scholars in recent years
to propose adjustments to the highly stringent Brandenburg
standard. Many of these arguments revolve around the same
fundamental premise: that the Brandenburg standard is a relic
of a bygone era, one that is ill-suited for our present world of the
internet and social media.50 In other words, they contend that
46 Hess v. Indiana, 414U.S. 105, 107–09 (1973) (per curiam) (finding no imminence
when defendant, at an anti-war protest, stated, “‘We’ll take the fucking street later,’ or ‘We’ll
take the fucking street again,’” since “at worst, [the speech] amounted to nothing more than
advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time”); see alsoAlexander Tsesis, Terrorist
Speech on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV. 651, 667 (2017) (“The incitement doctrine applies
only to imminently dangerous statements and is hence of limited value to combat internet
terrorist incitement.”). The statement also would not likely qualify as a true threat, as the
speaker is not directly threatening a specific person or group, but merely calling for others to
take up violent action in the abstract. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Incendiary Speech and
Social Media, 44 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 147, 158 (2011). Nor would it be sufficiently specific to
constitute speech integral to criminal conduct, like aiding and abetting a crime. Cf. Rice v.
Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 248–50 (4th Cir. 1997) (deeming the defendant’s book
unprotected speech because it “aided and abetted the murders at issue through the
quintessential speech act of providing step-by-step instructions for murder (replete with
photographs, diagrams, and narration) so comprehensive and detailed that it is as if the
instructor were literally present with the would-be murderer”).
47 As the Brandenburg Court itself stated, “[T]he mere abstract teaching . . . of
the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the
same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.”Brandenburg,
395 U.S. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961)).
48 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989); Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
49 SeeRichardH. Fallon, Jr.,Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLAL.REV. 1267, 1313
(2007) (“In free speech cases, the Supreme Court most commonly applies a version of strict
scrutiny that is ‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
50 To be sure, this is not the only basis upon which scholars have challenged the
viability of Brandenburg as applied to online terrorist advocacy. Many have also based
their arguments on national security exceptionalism—the idea that “courts show more
deference to the state, and are correspondingly less protective of civil liberties, during times
of war or other national security crises.” Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and the Confluence of
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the broad Brandenburg standard has been rendered obsolete by
intervening technological changes, and some sort of doctrinal
adjustment is necessary to give the government the appropriate
flexibility to regulate under these changed conditions.51
In this Part, I will delve into these arguments in detail. But
before doing so, I will take a brief detour to discuss the Court’s recent
landmark decision in Carpenter v. United States—a Fourth
Amendment case that similarly dealt with the potential conflict
between longstanding constitutional rights doctrine and technological
change. A close examination of Carpenter helps to frame the central
theoretical debate underlyingBrandenburg’s continued viability, and
it illuminates the various pivot points around which the debate rests.
A. The Court’s Decision in Carpenter
In Carpenter, the Court confronted a Fourth Amendment
challenge to the government’s use of cell-site location
information (CSLI)—in essence, location data produced by
modern cell phones constantly pinging nearby cell towers.52 As
the Court noted, cell phones “tap into the wireless network
several times a minute whenever their signal is on, even if the
owner is not using one of the phone’s features.”53 Furthermore,
“[w]ireless carriers collect and store CSLI for their own business
purposes,” and they also sell aggregated CSLI data to data
brokers.54 The Court observed that given the current density of
cell sites, CSLI data may be capable of “pinpoint[ing] a phone’s
location within 50 meters.”55 In Carpenter, the government had
obtained historical CSLI records of Timothy Carpenter’s cell
phone without a warrant, and using these records, it established
at trial that Carpenter was at the scene of four separate
robberies at the time they occurred, leading to his conviction.56
As the Court observed, the background law revolved
around two different sets of cases. First, in United States v.
National Security and Internet Exceptionalism, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 379, 386 (2017); see
also id. at 386-91 (describing different scholarly arguments based on this premise).
51 Although my focus here is on arguments made specifically in response to the
recent rise of high-profile terrorist attacks, versions of these arguments have been made
dating back to the early days of the internet. See generally Alexander Tsesis, Prohibiting
Incitement on the Internet, 7 VA. J.L. &TECH. 5 (2002); Scott Hammack, Note, The Internet
Loophole: Why Threatening Speech On-Line Requires a Modification of the Courts’
Approach to True Threats and Incitement, 36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 65 (2002).
52 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 2212.
55 Id. at 2219.
56 Id. at 2212–13.
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Knotts57—a case dealing with tracking “beepers” used to help
police follow vehicles through traffic58—the Court held that “[a]
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one
place to another.”59 The Court reasoned that any person traveling
on public thoroughfares could be observed and followed by any
member of the public; as such, she has “voluntarily conveyed” her
location and movement “to anyone who wanted to look.”60
Second, the Court had long adhered to the principle that
“a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information
he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”61 The Court had
applied this third-party doctrine in finding no Fourth
Amendment violations with respect to warrantless acquisitions
of a defendant’s bank records (in United States v. Miller)62 or a
log of his outgoing phone calls made from his home phone (in
Smith v. Maryland).63 In both cases, the Court held that the
defendant—having voluntarily conveyed the information to a
third party (the bank and the phone company, respectively)—
assumed the risk that the business records retained by the
companies would be shared with the police.64
Setting aside longstanding debates regarding the wisdom
of these doctrinal principles,65 both of them—at least on their
face—clearly apply to CSLI records. Just as a person making a
bank transaction is voluntarily conveying the information to
bank employees, any person using a cell phone is voluntarily
conveying CSLI information to the wireless provider.66 And just
57 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
58 Id. at 277. The “beeper” in question was a “radio transmitter . . . which
emit[ted] periodic signals that [could] be picked up by a radio receiver.” Id. The facts of
Knotts made clear that the transmitter had a limited geographic range, as the pursuing
officers at one point lost its signal before picking it up again an hour later. See id. at 278.
59 Id. at 281.
60 Id. at 281–82.
61 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
743–44 (1979)).
62 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
63 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
64 Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43; Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46.
65 As Orin Kerr observed, “The third-party doctrine is the Fourth Amendment rule
scholars love to hate. It is the Lochner of search and seizure law, widely criticized as
profoundly misguided.” Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 561, 563 (2009) (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 563 n.5 (“A list of every article or book
that has criticized the doctrine would make this the world’s longest law review footnote.”).
66 The Carpenter Court distinguished the sort of “voluntary exposure” involved
in CSLI data collection. It argued that phone users do not voluntarily assume the risk of
exposing comprehensive CSLI data in any “meaningful sense,” given that the use of cell
phone services “is indispensable to participation in modern society” and that “a cell phone
logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without any affirmative act on the part of the
user beyond powering up.” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (citation omitted). But in doing so,
the Court effectively signaled a shift in the doctrine rather than apply the existing doctrine
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as a person has no privacy interest in the bank’s own business
records logging such transactions, neither does she have a
privacy interest in the CSLI records kept for business purposes
by cell phone providers. Furthermore—at least to the extent that
the CSLI data is used to track the suspect’s movements on public
thoroughfares—she cannot be deemed to have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, as she can be freely observed and followed
by anyone on such thoroughfares.
But the technological gap between the relatively crude
beeper in Knotts and the CSLI-based tracking in Carpenter (or
the GPS tracking in United States v. Jones67) is substantial. The
beeper used in Knotts ultimately provided the police with only
incremental benefits in physically tracking a vehicle on public
thoroughfares, as it still required the police to physically follow
the vehicle in order to stay within range of the beeper’s signal.68
Thus, Knotts still largely left intact what Justice Alito described
as the “greatest protection[ ] of privacy” in this circumstance: the
practical cost of constant physical monitoring of a vehicle
(through police stakeouts, helicopters, and so forth).69
By contrast, GPS trackers and CSLI data “make long-
term monitoring relatively easy and cheap,” eliminating the
primary practical barrier to extensive and long-running location
tracking.70 Police need not follow a vehicle equipped with a GPS
tracker, or physically observe where the suspect is carrying his
phone; rather, GPS and CSLI tracking are relatively costless,
fully automated, and exhaustive in nature.
Furthermore, the sheer breadth of the information
available from CSLI records or GPS tracking goes well beyond
that available from bank records or pen registers. Each can
potentially provide a detailed and exhaustive log of a person’s
physical location over a span of years, and as the Carpenter
Court noted, “There is a world of difference between the limited
in a straightforwardmanner; as Kerr observed, the Court framed its voluntariness analysis
as a normative judgment premised on whether the voluntariness in question was
“meaningful” rather than as a simple question of fact. Orin S. Kerr, Implementing
Carpenter, in THE DIGITAL FOURTH AMENDMENT (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3301257.
67 In Jones, which was decided before Carpenter, the Court deemed
unconstitutional the police’s use of a GPS tracking device to monitor the location of the
defendant’s vehicle over a 28-day span. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012).
The Court premised its holding specifically on the government’s physical trespass on
Jones’s car, sidestepping the question of whether the tracking itself violated his reasonable
expectation of privacy. Id. at 410–13. In separate opinions, however, five Justices appeared
to agree that long-term GPS tracking does violate a person’s reasonable expectation of
privacy. See id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 430–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
68 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983).
69 Jones, 565 U.S. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring).
70 Id.
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types of personal information addressed in Smith andMiller and
the exhaustive chronicle of location information casually
collected by wireless carriers today.”71
Carpenter therefore centered on the disconnect between
significant technological change on the one hand and longstanding
constitutional rights doctrine on the other. The third-party doctrine
was developed in a world of crude tracking beepers, bank records,
and pen registers. But the emergence of GPS and CSLI tracking
technology radically altered the preexisting balance between
individual rights and the government’s freedom to act, as it allowed
the government to obtain incredibly accurate, exhaustive, and
detailed location data—data containing far more intimate
information than mere bank records or pen registers—over a long
period of time, at minimal cost. In this manner, technology
radically enhanced the government’s capacity to intrude into
individuals’ private lives to a degree that was unthinkable when
the preexisting doctrinal framework was developed.
So what is a court to do under these circumstances? This
scenario ultimately forces courts to confront and clarify the
fundamental nature of the right in question. On the one hand, the
right—as reflected in constitutional doctrine—may be conceptualized
as capturing a particular preestablished, instrumental equilibrium
between individual interests and state interests. On this view, if
technological change were to throw off this equilibrium in some
significant way, the court is free to adopt doctrinal adjustments to
recapture the “correct” instrumental balance.On the other hand, the
right—and the doctrine reflecting the right—may be conceptualized
as resting on a set of fundamental principles that continue to apply
regardless of any radical changes to this balance (whether
technologically based or otherwise).
The former view reflects a dynamic that Orin Kerr, in the
Fourth Amendment context, has called the “equilibrium-
adjustment” approach to social and technological change.72 As
Kerr describes this approach, “When new tools and new
practices threaten to expand or contract police power in a
significant way, courts adjust the level of Fourth Amendment
protection to try to restore the prior equilibrium.”73 In other
words, courts continuously modify constitutional rights doctrine
as a “correction mechanism” to account for fundamental changes
to the existing balance between government power and
71 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
72 See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth
Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 480 (2011).
73 Id.
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individual rights.74 Technological change may render the
existing doctrinal framework obsolete, and it is up to the courts
to update it accordingly.
The Carpenter Court clearly adopted this equilibrium-
adjustment approach to technological change. In outlining the
contours of the Fourth Amendment right, the Court highlighted
the “historical understandings of what was deemed an
unreasonable search and seizure when [the Fourth Amendment]
was adopted,” indicating that “a central aim of the Framers was
to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police
surveillance.”75 Thus, “[a]s technology has enhanced the
Government’s capacity to encroach upon areas normally guarded
from inquisitive eyes, this Court has sought to assure[ ]
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that
existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”76
As such—despite the fact that the government’s
acquisition of CSLI data quite comfortably fit within the
principles set forth in Knotts and the third-party doctrine as
developed inMiller and Smith—the Court deemed it a search for
Fourth Amendment purposes, stating:
[W]hile the third-party doctrine applies to telephone numbers and
bank records, it is not clear whether its logic extends to the
qualitatively different category of cell-site records. After all, when
Smith was decided in 1979, few could have imagined a society in
which a phone goes wherever its owner goes, conveying to the wireless
carrier not just dialed digits, but a detailed and comprehensive record
of the person’s movements.
We decline to extend Smith and Miller to cover these novel
circumstances.77
The Court therefore made clear that despite appearances to the
contrary, the third-party doctrine—that “a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily
turns over to third parties”78—is not, in fact, a fundamental
statement of principle. Rather, it is merely shorthand for a
balancing judgment calibrated for a particular set of technological
and social conditions—aworld of beepers and pen registers rather
than GPS tracking and CSLI data.
74 Id.
75 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (first quoting Carroll v. United States, 276 U.S. 132, 149 (1925); and
then quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 598 (1948)).
76 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kyllo
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
77 Id. at 2216–17.
78 Id. at 2216.
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Thus, at least in the context of CSLI, the Court viewed the
preexisting doctrine as capturing a particular equilibrium between
individual privacy and the state’s freedom to act. When
technological change undermines the empirical premises and
assumptions underlying the existing doctrinal framework, the
doctrine is rendered obsolete and must be adjusted to account for
that change. In other words, the Fourth Amendment envisions a
particular equilibrium between government intrusion and
individual privacy, leaving courts free to adjust even longstanding
doctrinal principles and frameworks to account for any
alterations of the balance caused by technological change.79
Courts, however, need not take this instrumental,
equilibrium-based approach when confronted with the challenges
posed by technological change on constitutional rights. They could
instead conceptualize the doctrinal framework as reflecting
broad, concrete principles that are fundamentally tied to the
underlying right itself: principles that—given the very nature of
the right—must continue to apply regardless of any changed
conditions wrought by technology.
Justice Kennedy advocated this approach in his Carpenter
dissent.80 In his view, the Court should have construed the third-
party doctrine as a broadly applicable principle—inherent to the
nature of privacy itself—that defendants simply do not retain any
reasonable expectation of privacy in information shared with
third parties (and specifically, in any business records developed
and owned by third parties).81 In other words, the third-party
doctrine must fundamentally follow from any meaningful
conception of privacy: it is simply nonsensical to state that
someone could have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily turned over to third parties. Thus, the
significant technological changes in question are of no import, and
there is no instrumental balance to recalibrate, because to
contradict the third-party principle is to contradict any
reasonable conception of privacy itself.
To be clear, the dynamic at play in cases like Carpenter is
not a simple binary question of whether courts have adopted an
equilibrium-adjustment view versus an absolute-principle view of
constitutional rights doctrine when faced with technological
change. Rather, the pure equilibrium-adjustment view and the
79 See Kerr, supra note 72, at 481–82 (“Equilibrium-adjustment maintains
fidelity to the Fourth Amendment in the face of rapid change by allowing judges to
maintain the balance struck by the Fourth Amendment.”).
80 Justice Kennedy’s dissent was joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Alito.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223 (Kennedy J., dissenting).
81 See id. at 2228–30.
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pure absolute-principle view of the doctrine represent extremes
on either end of a spectrum, and the more precise question is
where courts fall (or should fall) along that spectrum.
To say that established doctrinal principles must be
viewed instrumentally to account for technological changes is not
to say that doctrine must always be modified in the face of every
such change. There is substantial cost associated with unsettling
broad doctrinal principles like the third-party doctrine: it injects
complexity and open-endedness into the doctrine, which produces
uncertainty amongst state and private actors, reduces
administrability, and opens the door to potentially worrisome
judicial discretion.82 So to the extent that the equilibrium
alteration produced by technological development is not
sufficiently severe to justify these associated costs, courts are
better off adhering to existing doctrinal principles, even if this
leads to a somewhat altered balance between individual and
governmental interests.
Similarly, even the most fundamental principles within
constitutional rights jurisprudence have their practical limits.
The clearest example of this is the Court’s use of strict scrutiny in
its constitutional rights doctrine, which effectively acts as a safety
valve to account for highly exceptional circumstances within
which even core constitutional rights must yield.83 At a certain
point, changed technological conditions may alter the balance
between individual and state interests to such an extent that
existing doctrinal principles are rendered effectivelymeaningless.
B. A New Incitement Standard for the Digital Age?
With this framework in mind, what exactly is the
fundamental nature of the Brandenburg test? It might be
conceptualized in instrumental terms, similar to the Carpenter
Court’s treatment of the third-party doctrine. PerhapsBrandenburg
simply captures the desired balance between the value of unfettered
speech on the one hand and the potential harms associated with
such speech on the other. As such, it ultimately represents a simple
judgment that the actual and potential harm of dangerous advocacy
short of the Brandenburg standard is insufficient to outweigh the
broad value of such speech. To be sure, speech falling short of the
standard might still cause riots, vandalism, or other illegal acts—
but the Court hasmade the judgment that when the standard is not
82 SeeDavidS.Han,Transparency in First AmendmentDoctrine, 65EMORYL.J. 359,
367–70 (2015) (describing the rules-versus-standards dynamic in First Amendment doctrine).
83 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional
Doctrine, 30 CONN. L. REV. 961, 961–62 (1998).
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met, the probability and magnitude of this harm is broadly
insufficient to trump the benefits associated with individuals’
freedom to speak freely.
If viewed in this manner, one might reasonably argue
that the Brandenburg standard is ripe for equilibrium
adjustment. When Brandenburg was decided in 1969, the
paradigmatic instances of dangerous advocacy the Court likely
had in mind were public rallies or the physical distribution of
leaflets.84 Under these conditions, the Court might have simply
made the pragmatic judgment that given the potential reach of
dangerous advocacy through such means—which are, by nature,
constrained by physical limitations—the likelihood of significant
harm resulting from such advocacy is sufficiently low, and the
value associated with protecting speech sufficiently high, that
constitutional protection is justified.85
Today’s world, however, is fundamentally different from the
world of 1969. Most significantly, the advent of the internet and
social media86 means that speakers currently have the ability to
communicate dangerous advocacy cheaply to countless listeners
around the world over an indefinite span of time, as opposed to the
limited number of people who happen to be within the speaker’s
physical proximity at that specific moment in time.87 According to
YouTube, “Over 2 billion logged-in users visit [the site] eachmonth[,]
and every day people watch over a billion hours of video and
84 See supra text accompanying note 8.
85 Or, perhaps, theBrandenburgCourt did not consider these sorts of instrumental
questions at all, since in the world of 1969, the degree of expected harm caused by advocacy
short of incitementwas sufficiently low that theCourt hadno real need to distinguish between
instrumental and principle-based justifications for the doctrinal test.
86 Some scholars have framed these arguments in terms of “internet exceptionalism,”
which Alan Chen describes as “the idea that courts may create new First Amendment rules to
reflect the ‘newness’ of digital communication platforms because of concerns that the internet
has fundamentally transformed human communication in ways that previous generations of
doctrine do not adequately accommodate.” Chen, supra note 50, at 385–86; see also Mark
Tushnet, Internet Exceptionalism: An Overview from General Constitutional Law, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1637, 1638 (2015) (describing “First Amendment Internet exceptionalism” as a
“way to refer to the question of whether the technological characteristics of the
Internet . . . justify treating regulation of information dissemination through the Internet
differently from regulation of such dissemination through nineteenth- and twentieth-century
media, such as print, radio, and television”).
87 See Tushnet, supra note 86, at 1651–58; Hammack, supra note 51, at 81
(“Before the Internet, it was difficult for a speaker’s message to spread throughout a small
community, much less to the rest of the world. Now, the same message posted on a web
page is available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week in almost any country in the
world.”). As discussed above, while the audience-expanding potential of technologies like
broadcast television was understood in 1969, such technologies are a far cry from the
expansive reach and minimal cost associated with speech disseminated over the internet.
See supra text accompanying note 9.
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generate billions of views.”88 Furthermore, one estimate of
worldwide social media users places the number at 2.8 billion,89 and
according to the PewResearchCenter, seventy-two percent of adults
in the United States use at least one social media site.90 Thus, as
Cass Sunstein observed, the internet and social media “can
dramatically amplify the capacity of speech in one place to cause
violence elsewhere at some uncertain time.”91 In purely
instrumental terms, if we assume that dangerous advocacy will
generally produce an X% chance that a listener will undertake
harmful action, then the capacity to disseminate such advocacy to
millions rather than hundreds of people would mean that the
likelihoodof such resultantharmful action ismultiplied accordingly.92
The internet and social media may alter the preexisting
equilibrium in another way: through the establishment of echo
chamber effects that magnify the power of dangerous advocacy to
produce harmful action.93 As many have observed, the internet in
general—and particularly social media platforms like Facebook
and Twitter—have enabled people to insulate themselves within
a cocoon of like-minded online users, news sources, and
commentary that share and reinforce their ideological views, at a
scope and to a degree far beyond what could have been
contemplated in 1969.94
88 YouTube for Press, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/yt/about/press/
[https://perma.cc/KFN2-88W8].
89 eMarketer, Number of Social Network Users Worldwide from 2010 to 2021
(in Billions), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/278414/number-of-worldwide
-social-network-users/ [https://perma.cc/3K8U-PBBF].
90 Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pew
internet.org/fact-sheet/social-media/ [https://perma.cc/6RSH-FT6M]. This number increases
to eighty-two percent for adults aged 30-49 and ninety percent for those aged 18-29. Id.
91 Cass R. Sunstein, Islamic State’s Challenge to Free Speech, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 23, 2015, 12:38 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-11-23/islamic-
state-s-challenge-to-free-speech [https://perma.cc/HV6A-PM6F].
92 See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional Caution, 1996 U. CHI. LEGALF. 361, 370
(observing that “[w]henmessages advocatingmurderous violence are sent to large numbers
of people, it is possible to think that the Brandenburg calculus changes”); Tushnet, supra
note 86, at 1653 (“Internet exceptionalism would allow legislatures to make the judgment
that the substantially larger audience available for communications over the Internet
increases otherwise acceptable levels of risk beyond a tolerable threshold.”). As Tushnet
notes, however, the increased size and accessibility of the audience can cut both ways in
the calculus, as it might also increase the social harm produced by suppressing thematerial
in question. Id. at 1654.
93 See, e.g., Posner, supranote 14 (“Today, the Internetmakes possible the constant
circulation of captivating videos, vivid images, and extremist text, creating a ‘radicalization
echo chamber.’”).
94 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF
SOCIAL MEDIA 2–5 (2017); Hammack, supra note 51, at 82–83 (observing that “the
Internet . . . facilitates the creation of networks of like-minded persons to help carry out
threats” and that it can provide “social structure” that encourages people “to perform violent
actions, mostly by making their beliefs seemmore socially acceptable”).
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And this echo chamber effect is not solely a function of
purposeful personal curation. Automated recommendation tools on
YouTube, for example, connect users to additional videos similar to
what they have been watching, and YouTube will autoplay those
videos immediately after the current video ends.95 In the past, these
tools have recommended lectures from Awlaki following “video[s]
as innocuous as CNN[ ] ” news reports regarding the cleric,96 and
they “often suggested [Awlaki’s] more sinister recordings to people
who watched material on Islam or sampled his history talks.”97
Furthermore, the algorithm-based nature of social networking
sites can drive users into increasingly extremist views, often
unwittingly. Facebook’s automated news feed, for example,
promotes content based on engagement,98 and this conception of
engagement is strongly driven by negative emotions such as
tribalism, fear, and anger.99 And both Twitter and Facebook are
designed to reward users for links and posts that draw the most
engagement, as each “like” and comment “delivers a little
dopamine boost, training [the user] to repeat whatever behavior
wins the most engagement,” regardless of whether that behavior is
extremist in nature.100
As such, the probability that dangerous advocacy will be
neutralized by counterspeech may be substantially reduced within
these echo chambers, while the probability that dangerous
advocacy will blossom into harmful action (by, for example,
reinforcing other dangerous advocacy within the echo chamber)
may be substantially heightened. In other words, if in 1969 the
likelihood that harmful action would result from dangerous
advocacy was X%, that likelihood may now be 5X% given the
operation of online echo chambers and the particularways inwhich
people today receive their news and commentary.
95 Autoplay Videos, GOOGLE: YOUTUBE HELP, https://support.google.com/you
tube/answer/6327615?hl=en [https://perma.cc/4ZAU-5X5P].
96 See COUNTER EXTREMISM PROJECT, supra note 31.
97 See Shane, supra note 32.
98 In this context, “engagement” means “the number of interactions people
have with [the] content (i.e. likes, comments, shares, retweets, etc.).” Kimberlee
Morrison, Cutting Through the Social Media Jargon: What Are Reach, Impressions and
Engagement?, ADWEEK (Sept. 17, 2015) (emphasis omitted), https://www.adweek.com/
digital/cutting-through-the-social-media-jargon-what-are-reach-impressions-and-
engagement/ [https://perma.cc/JU3V-NACD].
99 Max Fisher & Amanda Taub, How Everyday Social Media Users Become
Real-World Extremists, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/
25/world/asia/facebook-extremism.html [https://perma.cc/4SFM-8NEG] (“Studies find
that negative, primal emotions — fear, anger — draw the most engagement. So posts
that provoke those emotions rise naturally. Tribalism — a universal human tendency —
also draws heavy engagement.”).
100 Id.
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As a result, perhaps some wholesale rebalancing of the
onerous Brandenburg standard is in order given the changes
wrought by modern technology. Perhaps Brandenburg is simply
obsolete doctrine that does not sensibly fit the world we
currently inhabit—a standard calibrated for a world of rallies
and leafletting rather than today’s world of the internet and
social media. And indeed, scholars in recent years have argued
for this sort of equilibrium adjustment to the doctrine. Sunstein,
for example, has argued that the government should have free
rein to regulate dangerous advocacy when “people are explicitly
inciting violence” and “it produces a genuine risk to public
safety, whether imminent or not.”101 Furthermore, Eric Posner
has called for a law that would, among other things, criminalize
“access[ing] websites that glorify, express support for, or provide
encouragement for ISIS”—a law that, as Posner notes, would
require significant modification of existing First Amendment
doctrine to be constitutional.102
But conceptualizing the Brandenburg standard in this
purely instrumental manner might produce some discomfort—a
discomfort rooted in the strong connection between the contours
of the Brandenburg test and principles that are fundamental to
the very concept of free speech. As theBrandenburgCourt noted,
its test reflected the cornerstone principle that advocacy—
speech that produces action by persuading the listener—must be
fully protected, while incitement—speech that produces action
by short-circuiting any sort of meaningful deliberation—need
not be protected.103 And as David Strauss observed, the Court
has consistently adhered to the principle that absent
“extraordinary circumstances, the government may not restrict
speech because it fears, however justifiably, that the speech will
persuade those who hear it to do something of which the
government disapproves.”104
101 Sunstein, supra note 91; see also Lidsky, supra note 46, at 164 (proposing a
modification to Brandenburg’s imminence requirement “so that it does not preclude liability
for social-media incitement”).
102 Posner, supra note 14.
103 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (per curiam) (“[T]he mere
abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety or evenmoral necessity for a resort to force and
violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such
action.” (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961))); see also David A.
Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 339
(1991) (“The persuasion principle, as I have defined it, directly justifies the requirement of
imminence: the risk of law violation can justify suppression of speech only if the speech
brings about the violation by bypassing the rational processes of deliberation.”).
104 Strauss, supra note 103, at 334.
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This persuasion principle, as Strauss calls it,105 follows
naturally from the primary theoretical justifications surrounding
the protection of free speech: democratic self-governance, the pursuit
of truth, and individual autonomy. Democratic self-governance
relies upon the open discussion and consideration of all ideas,
whether they be deemed good or bad, dangerous or not; thus,
democracy cannot flourish without the unfettered opportunity to
persuade other citizens regarding issues of public concern.106
Similarly, the marketplace of ideas cannot operate to identify truth
unless “dangerous” ideas can be tested alongside all other ideas;
persuasion is the ultimate mechanism by which the truth is
identified and falsehoods discarded.107 Finally, individual autonomy
cannot be fully realized unless each person has the opportunity to
persuade—and to be persuaded—with respect to all ideas in
formulating her own personal identity and views. As Strauss
argued, violations of the persuasion principle are wrong because
they “involve a denial of autonomy in the sense that they interfere
with a person’s control over her own reasoning processes.”108
Viewed in this manner, the narrowness of the
Brandenburg test reflects the Court’s recognition of the
persuasion principle as a fundamental aspect of free speech. Its
requirements reflect the Court’s attempt to identify speech that
produces harm through a mechanism other than persuasion:
speech that is directed and intended to incite imminent lawless
action, and is likely to bring about such imminent action. Its
concern is with the speaker who works a hostile crowd into a
frenzy, then immediately exhorts it to burn down the building
across the street—the sort of harmful speech that relies upon
short-circuiting persuasion and deliberation with emotion and
instinct. Thus, under this view, any attempt to institute
equilibrium adjustment to extend the reach of government
regulation to dangerous advocacy operating via persuasion—even
if technological change has drastically amplified the social harms
caused by such advocacy—is an attempt to cross a chasm that
simply cannot be crossed, at least under any meaningful
conception of free speech.
105 Id.
106 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 16–17, 26 (1948).
107 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market.”); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 87 (David Bromwich & George Kateb
eds., 2003) (1859) (arguing that the free exchange of ideas provides society with “the
opportunity of exchanging error for truth”).
108 Strauss, supra note 103, at 354.
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III. SOMEOBSERVATIONS REGARDING THENATURE OF
BRANDENBURG
So how should we conceptualize the Brandenburg
standard? As an initial matter, neither approach appears to be
formally foreclosed by the Brandenburg decision itself. Although
the Brandenburg Court appeared to frame the test as a matter of
fundamental principle rather than as an instrumental balance, it
of course never confronted the very different technological context
of today—one in which the potential harms caused by dangerous
advocacy may be substantially greater than those present in the
rally-and-leaflet world of 1969. Perhaps the Brandenburg Court
would have crafted a very different doctrinal standard that better
reflects these very different conditions. Or, on the other hand,
perhaps the Court would have crafted the exact same standard,
under the rationale that fundamental First Amendment
principles require us to absorb even this significantly greater
degree of harm caused by dangerous advocacy. Thus—as is typical
within the realm of constitutional rights jurisprudence—how one
answers this question is ultimately based on an intuitional
judgment premised on a wide variety of potential factors, such as,
for example, one’s general predilection for conceptualizing the
First Amendment in instrumental terms rather than
deontological terms (or vice-versa).
My guess, however, is that for most courts, applying this
sort of instrumental, “equilibrium-adjustment” framework to the
Brandenburg standard would bring significantly more discomfort
than the Carpenter Court’s application of such an approach to the
third-party doctrine. As such, my sense is that courts would be
more likely to conceptualize the persuasion principle—as
encapsulated in the Brandenburg standard—as fundamental to
the concept of the freedom of speech in a way that the third-party
doctrine is not with respect to personal privacy.109
One reason for this distinction might be an overarching
sense that First Amendment rights and Fourth Amendment rights
are inherently different, in a manner that makes courts far more
likely and willing to embrace equilibrium adjustment in the latter
rather than the former. At least on its face, the First Amendment
right to free speech appears absolute: “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”110By contrast, the Fourth
109 As noted above, however, at least three Justices in Carpenter highlighted
what they perceived to be the absurdity of adhering to any conception of the Fourth
Amendment that would recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in a third party’s
business records. See supra text accompanying notes 80–81.
110 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Amendment establishes constitutional protection against
“unreasonable searches and seizures.”111 By reference to a
reasonableness standard, the Fourth Amendment’s text suggests a
more pragmatic and context-sensitive approach to delineating the
boundaries of the right,112 as compared to the First Amendment’s
blunt, unqualified delineation of the free speech right. And indeed,
the Court’s rhetoric surrounding these two rights reflects this
different feel to each right: discussions of free speech will often
include lofty rhetoric regarding absolute principles,113 whereas in
the Fourth Amendment context, the Court has tended to describe
the right in terms of a pragmatic balance.114
Another reason might be a tendency for courts to adhere to
a one-way ratchet approach, in which they may be more willing to
institute equilibrium adjustments to the doctrine when
technological change expands the scope of government intrusion
upon the individual right in question, as compared to when such
change limits the scope of such intrusion. In other words, courts
might simply have an easier time ratcheting constitutional
protections up in response to technological change rather than
bringing them down. Thus, for example, theCarpenterCourtmight
be far more comfortable instituting an equilibrium adjustment
bolstering individuals’ privacy rights where technology (CSLI
tracking) has greatly increased the government’s capacity to
intrude on such privacy. But courts may be far less willing to do so
in the Brandenburg scenario, as there is simply greater discomfort
in reducing the protection afforded to the individual right in
question to account for technological change, even if such change
111 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
112 See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 861 (2004) (“It is
generally agreed that the general pragmatic goal of both constitutional and statutory
law governing search and seizure is to create a workable and sensible balance between
law enforcement needs and privacy interests.”).
113 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727 (2012) (plurality opinion)
(“The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true. This is the ordinary course in a
free society. The response to the unreasoned is the rational; to the uninformed, the
enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the simple truth.”); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.”); see also Frederick Schauer, The First Amendment as Ideology, 33 WM. &MARY
L. REV. 853, 866 (1992) (“With numbing frequency, the same platitudes and slogans
substitute for argument whenever the subject of free speech arises within those institutions
dependent on free speech for their existence.”).
114 See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (“The Fourth
Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search
and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests
as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.”).
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has resulted in a fundamentally altered balance between
individual and government interests.
That being said, even if courts were to conceptualize the
persuasion principle—operationalized in the Brandenburg
standard—as intrinsic to free speech doctrine, the practical
reality is that even the most fundamental principles may yield in
the face of extreme conditions. For example, if technological and
social conditions were such that fifty thousand lives were being
lost each year due to violent acts directly caused by dangerous
online advocacy, even the most speech-friendly courts would be
hard-pressed to deny the government the ability to regulate such
speech directly. What a court may do in a given case, therefore,
may be premised largely on its determination of whether these
sorts of highly extenuating circumstances have been met, such
that a broad reconsideration of even core First Amendment
principles is in order.
Thus, pragmatically speaking, courts’ willingness to depart
from the Brandenburg standard will rest to a significant extent on
their broad judgments regarding various difficult-to-prove
empirical questions. For example, to what extent does access to a
larger audience over the internet actually translate to a greater
likelihood of harmful actions? One might argue that although the
internet allows dangerous advocacy to reach far larger audiences
thanwould be possible in a world of rallies and leafleting, the sheer
volume of speech available over the internet also works to dilute
the effect of that speech on viewers who are constantly bombarded
by a multitude of varied messages (including counterspeech
seeking to neutralize the advocacy in question).115
Other questions might include the extent to which echo
chambers actually work to magnify dangerous advocacy,116 the
extent to which a meaningful causal connection can be drawn
between the abstract advocacy in question and the ultimate harmful
act, and the extent to which any harms caused by broad
dissemination of dangerous advocacy are outweighed by its social
benefits.117 And necessarily tied up in these difficult judgments are
broad questions of deference: how onerous should the government’s
115 See Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Extremist Speech and the Internet: The
Continuing Importance of Brandenburg, 4 HARV. L. & POL’YREV. 361, 371 (2010) (“[J]ust as
the internet allows a reader to access troubling content quickly and easily, he or she may
obtain contrary information just as readily.”); Chen, supra note 50, at 394 (observing that
with the advent of the internet, “[h]ateful speech is cheap and easy, but so is counterspeech”).
116 See Margot E. Kaminski, Incitement to Riot in the Age of Flash Mobs, 81 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1, 78–79 (2012) (describing the academic debate surrounding the echo
chamber effect of online communications).
117 See Tushnet, supra note 86, at 1654.
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burden be to establish these sorts of empirical premises?118Although
the Court’s institutional role in the First Amendment context is to
check government abuse and manipulation of the marketplace of
ideas,119 it is also poorly equipped to independently evaluate, for
example, the persuasiveness of conflicting sociological studies.120
Courts’ willingness to depart from Brandenburg under
various circumstances will also rest on broad normative judgments
regarding fundamental questions of First Amendment theory and
doctrine. What exactly is the value of speech under these
circumstances, and how should that measure up against the
substantial social harm caused by it? Under what conditions should
even the strongest constitutional principles—like the extreme
suspicion of any direct government regulation of public discourse—
give way to pragmatic considerations? Courts’ differing intuitions
regarding these sorts of fundamental questionswill of course greatly
influence their willingness to recognize extenuating circumstances
justifying a departure from the Brandenburg standard.
It is worth noting, however, that even if the Supreme Court
were to deem such extenuating circumstances to be present in a
particular case, this need not translate to wholesale adjustment of
the Brandenburg standard. Rather, the Court might decide to carve
out a case-specific exception to Brandenburg under a narrow
application of the strict scrutiny standard.121 While this sort of
narrow carve-out would still work to undermine the categorical
nature of the standard, it would also telegraph the Court’s intention
to adhere to the Brandenburg standard as the broadly governing
test, even within the very different technological world of today.
CONCLUSION
Evaluating the fifty-year-oldBrandenburg standard within
the present-day context yields two contradictory impulses. On the
one hand, there is a natural desire to view constitutional rights
doctrine as immutable and absolute—a view consistent with the
broad conception of rights as rigid protections largely immune from
118 Cf.Chen, supra note 50, at 392 (questioning whether “courts may feel the need
to defer to government regulation of terrorist incitement made more possible because of
rapid advances in digital technologies” based on “fear generated by legal decision-makers’
lack of familiarity with such technologies”); Tushnet, supra note 86, at 1646–48.
119 See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977
AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 521, 527–28.
120 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 855 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“This Court has always thought it owed an elected legislature some degree of
deference in respect to legislative facts . . . , particularly when they involve technical
matters that are beyond our competence, and even in First Amendment cases.”).
121 SeeHan, supra note 13, at 496–98.
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the vicissitudes of changing times and circumstances. On the other
hand, Brandenburg—like all constitutional rights doctrine—is
inescapably the product of its particular time and context. Thus, to
ignore the broad differences between the technological conditions
under which that rule originated and the internet-and social
media-connected world of today might, in the end, be perpetuating
an obsolete doctrinal standard that grows increasingly divorced
from the actual world in which we live.
There is no easy or obvious answer to this question. As
described above, one’s position necessarily rests on a broad range
of normative preferences and empirical judgments—matters upon
which reasonable minds will certainly differ. Thus, in practical
terms, perhaps the central imperative is that courts confront these
sorts of questions in a deep, open, candid, and transparentmanner,
directly articulating, evaluating, and debating the various
intuitional judgments upon which these questions rest.122 Whether
or not we ever reach consensus as to how First Amendment
doctrine should adapt in the face of significant technological
change, clearly identifying and debating the fundamental bases
upon which we disagree—in a deep and forthright manner—will
ultimately be vital in preserving the capacity of First Amendment
doctrine to evolve in a healthy manner.
122 SeeHan, supra note 82, at 371–79 (describing the value of analytical transparency
in First Amendment doctrine).
